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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
PROCEDURE
Pleadings
During the term, a number of significant announcements
were made which interpret procedural provisions affecting ex-
propriation cases.
In the Rottman case,1 the first circuit examined the applica-
bility of the Code of Civil Procedure to an expropriation suit and
determined that an expropriation defense was abandoned, pur-
suant to the Code,2 where no answer had been filed within five
years of the filing of a petition for expropriation and the funds
deposited by the expropriator in the registry of the trial court
had been withdrawn by the expropriatee. While a provision in
the expropriation statutes might have been utilized to dispose
of the case, since it provides for waiver of defenses where no
timely answer has been filed,8 the Code of Civil Procedure would
seem properly available to eliminate any possible question as to
the existence of laches where the delay is of a magnitude to
qualify. In these circumstances, the trial judge is deemed en-
titled to respond favorably to a motion for final judgment on the
ground that the suit has been finally concluded.
Where the issue is the adequacy of severance damages to the
remainder rather than the fairness of compensation for the prop-
erty actually taken, the legislature in 1954 provided a relief
measure enabling the expropriatee to delay his answer without
fear of losing his defense of inadequacy for lack of timeliness.4
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Rottman, 213 So.2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
2. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 561.
3. LA. R.S. 48:452 (Supp. 1966). State v. Higgins, 135 So.2d 306 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1961), clearly holds that unless an answer is filed within the statutory
period of thirty days provided in LA. R.S. 48:450 (Supp. 1966) all defenses are
waived under LA. R.S. 48:452 (Supp. 1966) for failure to answer timely, in-
cluding the defense that the compensation deposited by the expropriator is
not adequate.
4. LA. R.S. 48:451 (Supp. 1966). In State v. William T. Burton Indus.,
Inc., 219 So.2d 837, 842 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), the court noted "that severance
damages be valued as of the date of the trial was statutorily intended to
specify that the damages the remainder suffers should be reduced by special
benefits which result to it from the completion of the highway construction,
not to deprive the landowner of compensation for damages sustained by his
tract because of any general increase in the value of land between the taking
and the trial. We do not believe that the legislature intended to deprive a
landowner of damages to his property undoubtedly caused him by the taking,
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In Genest,5 the third circuit again recognized that the purpose
of this provision is to permit the expropriatee to prove damage
after the project has been completed and the full extent of the
damage determined; he is permitted to file a timely answer on
this issue within one year after he is notified of final acceptance
of a project by the expropriator and to prove his severance dam-
ages at the time of trial. He must, however, be prepared to prove
damages in fact, since the burden is upon him to prove as well
as allege. The trial court was held properly entitled to disregard
"vague and generalized testimony" as to loss of value in remain-
ders because of their shape where similarly shaped plots had been
marketed successfully in the vicinity.6
In Hatcher v. Gulf States Utilities Co.,7 expropriatee sought,
in a separate suit, severance damages alleged to have accrued
subsequent to the taking and for which no compensation was
received in the original proceeding. The expropriatee had there
been awarded severance damages by the trial court but they
were on appeal deleted as unproved.8 In this subsequent suit a
plea of res judicata was successfully interposed by the expropri-
ator and was affirmed on appeal. The first circuit reasoned that
severance damages can be determined at the moment of expro-
priation and if expropriatee then fails to carry the burden of
proof that such damages have been incurred, the issue is properly
res judicata.9
Occasional hardship results, no doubt, from the requirement
that severance damages be proved at the time of taking; under
the Department of Highways quick-taking procedures, as noted,
such possible hardship from difficulty of proof is mitigated by
provision of the alternative, pursuant to which the expropriatee
can elect to try the issue of severance damages after completion
of the project by filing an answer within one year from the date
he is notified of the acceptance of such completed project. 10 The
contention that prayers for severance damages are premature if
simply because-in the long interval between the taking itself and the sub-
sequent completion of the long-term major highway construction project-
his property had increased in value due to generally improved economic con-
ditions, along with all lands in the area (and, probably, most other lands in
the entire State)."
5. State v. Genest, 218 So.2d 114 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
6. Id. at 116.
7. 219 So.2d 208 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
8. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Hatcher, 184 So.2d 326 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
9. Hatcher v. Gulf States Util. Co., 219 So.2d 208, 212 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969).
10. LA. R.S. 48:451 (Supp. 1966).
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filed prior to completion has been rejected on the ground that
expropriatee is not thereby precluded from asserting his claim
to severance damages earlier if he chooses to do so." No such
alternative is provided in the general expropriation statute.
12
Venue
Tenneco, Inc. v. Earhart' was a suit brought under the gen-
eral expropriation statute for the taking of pipeline right of way
with venue set in the parish where the land is situated pursuant
to the general expropriation statute.14 Expropriatees made no ap-
pearance at the trial and after proof by the expropriator, final
judgment was rendered for the expropriator, with the right re-
served to the expropriatee to prove additional damages as a re-
sult of the taking. Upon appeal, the most interesting error al-
leged by the expropriatee was that the venue of the suit did not
conform to the venue requirements of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure in that suit was not brought at the domicile of the defen-
dant.1 5 The third circuit rejected the attack on the ground that
enactment of general rules of venue did not repeal special venue
provisions in such statutes as the expropriation statute since the
general provision was made specifically not applicable where
venue was otherwise provided by law.16
InterlocutoTy Appeals
In the taking in State v. Kilchrist"7 an issue of ownership
was raised by the parties and disposed of in a separate trial by
the district court. A motion to dismiss an appeal therefrom was
rested on the ground that the judgment was interlocutory and
non-appealable unless threatening irreparable injury.18 Against
the motion, it was argued that the judgment qualified as a partial
but final judgment on an incidental demand and was appeal-
able.19 In a per curiam opinion, the third circuit decided it was
the latter although the reasons adduced might well have sup-
ported a holding that it was an appealable interlocutory judg-
11. State v. Williams, 131 So.2d 600, 605 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). For ex-
perience under this provision, see Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 91, 102-103 (1965).
12. LA. R.S. 19:2.1 (1950).
13. 220 So.2d 109 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
14. LA. R.S. 19:2.1 (1950).
15. LA. CODE Civ. P. art 42(1).
16. Id. art. 43.
17. 222 So.2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
18. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2083.
19. Id. art. 1915(4).
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ment because threatening irreparable damage. That failure to
finally determine such a title issue could have deleterious effects
on the trial of the expropriation suit seems sufficiently clear to
warrant departure from the admonition against "piecemeal ap-
peals."20
JUST COMPENSATION
Income Capitalization
In Parish of East Baton Rouge v. S. & H. Heating Co.,21 the
expropriatee persuaded the trial court that severance damages
should be calculated as the difference between the market value
of the condemned land at its total future permissive use imme-
diately before and immediately after the expropriation. Since
such total permissive use would be reduced by the taking, it was
urged that the capitalization of income formula should reflect
the loss in severance damages. The first circuit rejected the
analysis on the ground that such damages were predicated on
conjecture and speculation, citing Rapides Parish School Bd. v.
Nassif22 among other cases. A stronger case might have been
State v. Hub Realty Co.23 in which the supreme court refused
to accept a calculation of the market value which the land would
have had if a shopping center were constructed thereon and
rented at prevailing rates. In the instant case the "permissive
use" involved the construction of a future parking lot and it was
urged that the taking reduced said future parking facility value
some ten percent.24
In State v. Mason2 5 severance damages to a filling station and
motel had been calculated in part by estimating that the net in-
come attributable to the land and improvements would be re-
duced ten percent by the taking and hence this net income de-
crease "capitalized" at ten percent represented damages. The
second circuit rejected the damages as inadequately proved, con-
cluding that the strip taken was not a "substantial or discernible
factor in the diminution of the motel revenue nor has the taking
20. Id. art. 2083, Comment (a): "The general concept that there is no
appeal except in the case of final judgments is universal in order to prevent
piecemeal appeals."
21. 216 So.2d 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
22. Id. at 364.
23. 239 La. 154, 118 So.2d 364 (1960).
24. Parish of East Baton Rouge v. S. & H. Heating Co., 216 So.2d 360, 364
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
25. 218 So.2d 329 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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adversely affected the rental value of the business units. '2 6 The
court did not find it necessary to further probe the capitalization
method used. Had it done so, it might have criticized the approach
as insufficiently distinguishing between unencumbered and leased
property in expropriatee's calculations since presumably for the
period of any lease in effect there would be no decrease in value;
if the damage was in fact suffered, it would lie in a lesser value
for the reversionary interest.27
In State v. Win. T. Burton Indus., Inc.,28 the third circuit re-
jected again the argument that in Louisiana the trier of fact is
not authorized to determine damages in an amount to which no
expert has testified; that court stated that its power to do so "is
a necessary correlative of the fact trier's right to evaluate the
weight to be given to each witness' testimony, as well as of its
right to make factual determinations as to which of the factors
relied upon by the witnesses relevantly influence market value
and severance damage.... [it] is not required to accept or to
reject the testimony of each witness in toto."'
Highest and Best Use
In Humble Pipeline Co. v. Win. T. Burton Indus., Inc.,80 the
supreme court was presented with a crop valuation problem in
a somewhat novel setting. A servitude was expropriated through
land then used for agriculture but as to which expert testimony
established industrial utilization as its highest and best use. The
award for the servitude was determined on the basis of the
diminution in value suffered for such industrial use. However, a
crop had already been planted thereon at the time of the expro-
priation and the issue arose as to whether its destruction in the
course of utilizing the right of way was subject to compensation,
over and above the amount awarded for diminution of the land
for industrial purposes.31 In the more conventional setting in
which the issue arises, where residential property is appraised
as commercial and the award made on that basis, no allowance
is made for the value of the residential improvements except
26. Id. at 333.
27. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA: AN ANALYSIS OF
EXPROPRIATION LAW AND PRACTICE (Mlmeo) ch. IV, § 8B4, p. IV-120 (1968).
28. 219 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
29. Id. at 845.
80. 253 La. 166, 217 So.2d 188 (1968), retg 205 So.2d 724 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967).
31. Id. at 170, 217 So.2d at 190.
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negatively, to reduce the commercial value of the net cost of re-
moving the residential improvements since such improvements
must be removed prior to commercial use.82 If the analogy is
carried over to agricultural land appraised for industrial develop-
ment, it would appear that only the net fair market value to an
industrial buyer, whether positive or negative, could be taken
into account.
In the instant case, the supreme court was persuaded that the
expropriatee should not be "penalized" for his good husbandry,
by disallowance of such crop value; 88 the expropriator plausibly
argued that if the value was to be allowed, there should be an
adjustment to reduce it to presumably its "net" value, although
the calculation is unclear.84 The court also relied upon a provision
in the expropriation laws requiring the Department of Highways
to compensate for crops destroyed as well as for property taken
for right of way.33 It seems likely, however, that this provision
was drafted with the taking in mind of agricultural lands which
had been appraised as agricultural rather than, as here, for a
more valuable industrial use, the higher fair market value of
which reflected its readiness for such use. This was, no doubt,
what the dissent had in mind when it quoted an earlier case to
the effect that "growing crops and timber upon the land and
minerals and other deposits in or under the land are circum-
stances to be considered as they affect the market value of the
land, but that they do not form an additional and separate value
for the purpose of just compensation.""
LEAsEHoLD PROBLEM
In State v. Holmes,7 the most recent supreme court decision
involving valuation of lease interests, the approach used by the
trial court in valuing the lessee's interest was conventional ex-
cept for the failure to discount the excess of economic rental over
contract rental back to the date of taking;8 the supreme court
32. State v. Gras, 141 So.2d 35, 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). Bee generally
H. KALTENBACH, JUST COMPENSATION REVISED § 1-4-2 at 47, 48 (1964).
33. Humble Pipeline Co. v. Wm. T. Burton Indus., Inc., 253 La. 166, 176, 217
So.2d 188, 193 (1968).
34. Humble Pipeline Co. v. Win. T. Burton Indus., Inc., 205 So.2d 724, 730
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
35. LA. R.S. 48:218 (1950).
36. Humble Pipeline Co. v. Win. T. Burton Indus., Inc., 253 La. 166, 178,
217 So.2d 188, 194 (1968).
37. 221 So.2d 811 (La. 1969).
38. State v. Cockerham, 182 So.2d 786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused
249 La. 110, 185 So.2d 219 (1966).
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found reversible error, however, in requiring the state to pay an
award to the lessee for lease advantage in addition to payment to
the lessor of the value of the unencumbered property. 9 The
Holmes case is ably discussed in a student Note in this issue.40
PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Albert Tate, Jr.*
No procedural decision of any great consequence was ren-
dered during the year, even though almost a third of the 1400 ap-
pellate opinions included procedural issues. This may demon-
strate the clarity of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure of
1960 and the efficiency of its working. The discussion of the year's
jurisprudence concentrates, therefore, on the few trouble areas
and recommends statutory change where indicated by nearly ten
years of experience with the Code.
ACTIONS AND PARTIES
Cumulation of Actions
The 1960 enactment liberalizes cumulation of actions and
permissive joinder of parties, an important Code reform.1 A
plaintiff may cumulate against a defendant all consistent actions,
even though based on different grounds, providing certain simple
procedural requirements are met, such as each being properly
venued. If multi-plaintiffs or multi-defendants are joined, there
must then also be "a community of interest" between the parties
joined, that is, the cumulated actions must arise out of the same
facts or present the same factual and legal issues.2
The cumulation articles have worked well in practice. The
39. Id. at 814.
40. Note, 30 LA. LAW REv. 346 (1969).
* Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit; Teacher of
Civil Procedure at the Louisiana State University Law School, 1967-69. The
writer acknowledges the research and editorial assistance afforded him by
David E. Soileau, Law Clerk, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for the 1969-70
term, member of the Evangeline and Calcasieu Parish bars.
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 461-65, 647. See McMahon, The Joinder of Parties
in Louisiana, 19 LA. L. Rsv. 1 (1958).
2. LA. COD@ CIV. P. art. 463(1), comment (c).
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